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ABSTRACT 
 
OPTIMAL CAPITAL INCOME TAXATION IN INFINITELY-LIVED 
OVERLAPPING GENERATIONS ECONOMIES 
 
Orkhan Hasanaliyev 
M. A. in Economics 
Advisor: Assist. Prof. Dr. Sabit Khakimzhanov 
July 2001 
 
This paper analyzes optimal capital income taxation in infinitely-lived 
overlapping generations economy for both cases when government has the ability to 
tax capital and labor income of individuals of different vintages differently and when 
it has no such an ability. In such an economy with the commitment technology I find 
that optimal long-run capital income tax is zero fot both cases. For a special caso of 
additively seperable utility functions, I find that if the government has rich set of 
fiscal instruments, then capital income tax is zero even along the transition path.  
 
Keywords and phrases: Optimal Taxation, OLG, Ramsey Equilibrium, 
Commitment Technology.   
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ÖZET 
 
EN İYİ SERMAYE KAZANÇLARI VERGISININ UZUN ÖMURLU 
ÇAKIŞAN NESILLER MODELINDE BELIRLENMESI  
 
Orkhan Hasanaliyev 
Ekonomi Bölümü Yuksek Lisans 
Danışman: Dr. Sabit Khakimzhanov 
Temmuz 2001 
Bu araştırma uzun ömürlü çakışan nesiller ekonomilerinde hükümet farklı 
nesillerin sermaye ve emek kazaçlarını farklı vergilendirebilme mekanizmasına 
sahibken ve böyle bir mekanizmadan yoksunken, sermaye kazaçlarının optimal 
vergilendirmesini ele almaktadır. Böyle bir ekonomide, hükümet sözüne sadıkken, 
her iki durum için de optimal verginin sıfır olduğu bulunmuştur. Fayda fonksyonu 
toplamaya göre ayrılabılır olduğu durumu için, hükümet farklı nesilleri farklı 
vergilendirme olanağına sahibken geçiş döneminde dahi sermaya kazanç vergisi sıfır 
olarak bulunmuştur.      
 
Anahtar kelimeler ve ifadeler: Optimal Vergilendirme, Çakışan Nesiller, 
Ramsey Dengesi, Taahhüt Teknolojileri.   
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1 Introduction 
 
One of the fundamental questions in tax policy literature is whether or not to tax the 
capital income and if yes at what rates. The traditional view for optimal capital 
income taxes were that it is not zero. Moreover, it held that capital income should be 
taxed heavily. In contradiction with this view Judd (1985) and Chamley (1986) 
argued that in the long-run optimal tax on capital income tends to zero.  
 
Judd (1985) found a zero optimal long-run capital income tax rate for steady 
state in dynamic general equilibrium with heterogeneous infinitely lived agents and 
nonseparable preferences. Chamley (1986) showed for the infinitely-lived agents 
model that the long run tax on capital income tends to zero. Chari, Christiano and 
Kehoe (1991) analyzed optimal policy in stochastic models. Optimal capital income 
taxation in endogenous growth models with physical and human capital was 
analyzed by Jones, Manuelli and Rossi (1993, 1997). For overlapping generations 
model with finitely lived agents Atkeson, Chari and Kehoe (1999) and Erosa and 
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Gervais (1998) showed that under certain homotheticity and separability conditions 
it is optimal not to tax capital income in steady state.  
The intuition behind the optimality of not taxing capital income in steady 
state is that taxing capital income in period t+1 is equivalent to taxing consumption 
at a higher rate in period t+1 than in period t. Therefore, a positive tax on capital 
income in a steady state is equivalent to an ever-increasing tax on consumption. And 
such a tax on consumption cannot be optimal. 
 
All the above optimal capital taxation analyses were made under 
commitment environment, i.e. in the environment where government can commit to 
its policies. For the no commitment case, Benhabib and Rustichini (1997) and 
Phelan and Stachetti (2001) showed that in the steady state capital tax rate may be 
positive and steady state capital may be different from that which would attain with 
full commitment. 
 In this paper, I investigate optimal capital income taxation for infinitely 
lived overlapping generation model. Without making additional assumptions about 
utility function, it is generally optimal to positively tax the capital income in the 
steady state for finitely lived overlapping generation models. In this paper, I analyze 
whether it is the case for infinitely lived overlapping generation models. In addition, 
I investigate optimal capital income taxation problem for the both cases when 
 3 
 
government taxes individuals’ incomes uniformly across generations and for the 
case without such a restriction. 
 
The thesis is organized as follows. The next chapter introduces the economy. 
The third chapter characterizes optimal fiscal policy and steady state capital income 
taxes. And concluding remarks are presented in the last chapter. 
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2 THE MODEL 
 
 
2.1 The Basic Structure 
 
Consider an economy in which there are an infinite number of time periods, t, 
indexed by positive integers. The economy is populated by overlapping generations 
of identical individuals. An individual born on date υ (the individual’s “vintage”) 
lives forever. The population is assumed to grow at constant rate n per period, so at 
any time t there is Nt=(1+n)tN0 individuals alive. It is convenient to assume that the 
economy starts at t=0 and N0=1. The individuals of vintage υ are not linked through 
operative intergenerational transfers to the individuals of pre-existing vintages. 
 
In each period the economy has two goods: a consumption-capital good and 
a labor. The objective of an individual born in period υ≥0 is given by  
 
∑∞
=
−−
− −
υ
υυ
υβ
t
tttt
t lcU )1,( ,,     (1) 
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where ct,t-υ and lt,t-υ  denote consumption and labor supply of the individual of 
vintage υ at period t. We assume that 0<β<1 and that the utility function U(ּ,ּ) is 
increasing in both arguments, twice differentiable, strictly concave, bounded above 
and satisfies  Inada conditions. 
∞=− )1,(lim lcU c  as c→0 , for all l and 
−∞=− )1,(lim lcUl  as l→1 , for all c 
 
where Uc and Ul denote the partial derivatives of the utility function with respect to 
consumption and labor, respectively. 
Individuals are endowed with one unit of labor in each period of their life.  
Let lt denote date t aggregate per capita labor input, which is total labor supplied by 
individuals divided by the total population.  
So,  
t
t
t
tttttt
t n
nlnnlnnll
l
)1(
)1(....)1( 0,
1
2,1,,
+
++++++=
−
−−   (2) 
                                                                                         
where lt,t-υ  denotes labor supply of the individual of vintage υ at period t≥ υ.  
Applying the same procedure for consumption, capital and debt, we denote by ct, kt, 
bt the aggregate per capita consumption, capital and debt at time t, respectively.  
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At each date there is a unique produced good that can be used for private 
consumption, government consumption, or as capital. The technology to produce 
goods is represented by constant returns to scale production function f(kt,lt), where kt 
and lt denote the levels of aggregate per capita capital and labor, respectively. 
Government consumption, gt, is exogenously given.  
Feasibility requires that the resource constraint should be satisfied, i.e. total 
consumption plus investment must be less then or equal to aggregate output: 
 
),()1()1( 1 tttttt lkfgkknc ≤+−−++ + δ     (3) 
   
where 0<δ<1 is the depreciation rate of capital, and all variables are expressed in per 
capita terms. 
Government expenditures are financed by proportional taxes on the income 
from labor and capital and by government debt. Tax rates on individual υ labor and 
capital income are denoted by τt,t-υ and θt,t-υ , respectively. Also it is assumed that at 
each date the tax rates on labor and capital are independent from the vintage of 
individuals. Hence, taxes are not vintage specific, within the same period 
government taxes each individual labor and capital incomes at the same rate. 
 So, for any t 
υν
υν
θθ
ττ
−−
−−
=
=
tttt
tttt
,,
,,  for ν≠υ and ν,υ≤t. 
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 Government issues bonds with one-period maturity. bt,t-υ is the government 
debt held by individual υ at time t, bt is the aggregate per capita debt and Rb,t is its 
return. Note that, since newly born individuals aren't linked by altruism to 
individuals of earlier vintage, they are born owning no financial wealth, so bt,0=0. 
Except for the individual of vintage 0, for whom b0,0 is given. The government 
budget constraint is  
 
ttttttttttb krlwbngbR )()1( 1, δθτ −+++=+ + .   (4) 
 
An individual υ budget constraint is 
 
υυυυυυ δθτ −−−−++−−++ +−−++−=++ tttbtttttttttttttt bRkrlwkcb ,..,.1.1.1,1 )))(1(1()1( (5) 
 
where rt and wt are the before-tax returns on capital and labor, and   
1+(1-θt )(rt-δ) is the gross return on capital after tax and depreciation, for simplicity 
denote it by Rk,t . Note also that kt,0=0, for all υ>0 and k0,0 is given .  
  Firms in this economy maximize profits: 
 
tttttt krlwlkf −−),(max .  (6) 
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The first-order conditions for (6) imply that before-tax return on capital and labor 
equal to their marginal products, i.e. 
),( ttkt lkfr =   (7) 
),( ttlt lkfw = .  (8) 
The government's objective is to maximize the social welfare which is defined as the 
discounted sum of individual lifetime welfares,  
 
∑∑ ∞
=
−−
−∞
=
−
υ
υυ
υ
υ
υ βγ
t
tttt
t lcU )1,(max ,,
0
  (9) 
    
where 0<γ<1 is the intergenerational discount factor.  
 
2.2 Competitive Equilibrium 
  
Let πt=(τt,θt) denotes the government policy at t, and let π denotes the policies for all 
t. Let xt,t-υ=(ct, t-υ lt, t-υ kt+1,t+1-υ, bt+1,t+1-υ) denotes an allocation of individual υ at time 
t≥ υ, and let xυ denote an allocation of υ for all t, and let x denote an allocation for all 
υ for all t. Let  (wt, rt, Rb,t) denotes a prices at t, and  let (w, r, Rb)  denote a price 
system for all t.  
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A competitive equilibrium for this economy is a policy π, an allocation x and price 
system (w, r, Rb), such that  
1) given the policy and the price system, the resulting allocation maximizes 
individual υ utility, (1), subject to his budget constraint (5), for all υ, 
2) the price system satisfies equations  (7) and (8),  
3) the government budget constraint (4) is satisfied for all t, 
4) and the aggregate feasibility constraint (3) is satisfied for all t.   
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3 OPTIMAL FISCAL POLICY 
 
 
3.1 Ramsey Equilibrium 
 
In order to characterize competitive equilibrium, I use the primal approach to 
taxation (Atkenson and Stiglitz (1989)). The idea of this approach is to define the 
problem of choosing optimal taxes as a problem of choosing allocations subject to 
constraints, which capture the restrictions on the type of allocations that can be 
supported as a competitive equilibrium for some choice of taxes. 
Consider now the policy problem faced by the government. Suppose that there is 
an institution or commitment technology through which government, in period 0, 
can bind itself to a particular sequence of policies once and for all. To model such a 
commitment we assume that government chooses a policy π at the beginning of time 
and then the consumers choose their allocations. This means that allocations rules 
are sequences of functions x(π)=(xt,t-υ(π)) that maps policies π into allocations x(π). 
Price rules are sequences of functions w(π)=(wt(π)) ,  r(π)=(rt(π)), Rb(π)=(Rb,t(π))  
that maps policies π into price systems.  
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Since the government needs to predict how individuals’ allocations and prices will 
respond to its policies, individuals allocations and prices must be described by rules 
that associate government policies with allocations.  
 
Definition: A Ramsey equilibrium is a policy π and an allocation rule x(·) and price 
rules w(·) and r(·) that satisfy the following two conditions: 
1) the policy π maximizes  
∑∑ ∞
=
−−
−∞
=
−
υ
υυ
υ
υ
υ ππβγ
t
tttt
t lcU ))(1),((max ,,
0
  (10) 
 
subject to the government constraint (4) with allocations and prices given by x(π), 
w(π), r(π) and 
2) For every π', the allocation x(π'), the price system w(π'), r(π') and Rb(π') the 
policy π' constitute competitive equilibrium.       
 
Proposition 1 (The Ramsey Allocation) The consumption and labor allocations in 
the Ramsey equilibrium solve the Ramsey problem  
∑∑ ∞
=
−−
−∞
=
−
υ
υυ
υ
υ
υ βγ
t
tttt
t lcU )1,(max ,,
0
 
 
1) subject to resource constraint (3) for all t 
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and implementability constraints:  
2) )()( 0,,0,,,, 0,,, υυυυυ
υυ
υ
υυυβ kRbRUlUcU kb
t
cttlttc
t
tttt
+=+∑∞
=
−−
−
−−       for all υ     (11) 
 
3) 
0,
0,
,
,
t
t
tt
tt
l
c
l
c
U
U
U
U =
−
−
υ
υ   for all t and υ≤t    (12) 
 
4) 
0,
1,1
,
1,1
t
t
tt
tt
c
c
c
c
U
U
U
U +
−
−++ =
υ
υ   for all t and υ≤t    (13) 
Proof: In the Ramsey equilibrium, the government must satisfy its budget constraint 
taking as given the allocation rule x(π). These requirements impose restrictions on 
the set of allocations the government can achieve  
I first show that a competitive equilibrium must satisfy (3), (11), (12), (13). 
Firstly to show that resource constraint is satisfied, all individuals’ budget 
constraints, who alive at period t, are added, so that we get an aggregate budget 
constraint,  
 
ttktbtbtttttt kRbRlwkncbn ,,,11 )1()1()1( ++−=++++ ++ τ .  (14) 
 
Summing (14) with the government budget constraint (4), we get 
ttttttt krlwgknc ))(1()1( 1 δ−−+=+++ + .    (15) 
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Using (7) and (8), we have the following resource constraint, 
 ),()1()1( 1 tttttt lkfgkknc =+−−++ + δ . 
 
 
Next consider the allocation rule x(π). The necessary and sufficient conditions for 
c,l,k and b to solve the individuals problem are given as follows: Let λt,t-υ denote the 
Lagrange multiplier on the individual υ budget constraint (5) at period t. Then these 
conditions are given by (5) with first-order conditions for consumption and labor  
0,, =− −− − υυ λβ υ ttct ttU     (16) 
0)1(,, =−+ −− − ttttlt wU tt τλβ υυ υ   (17) 
first-order conditions for capital: 
01,1,1, =+− +−++− tktttt Rυυ λλ    (18) 
first-order conditions for debt: 
01,1,1, =+− +−++− tbtttt Rυυ λλ    (19) 
 
and transversality conditions 
0lim ,, =−− υυλ ttttb  as t→∞  (20) 
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0lim ,, =−− υυλ ttttk  as t→∞  (21) 
Multiplying consumer’s budget constraint with λt,υ and summing over t and using 
(18) and (19) gives 
∑∞
=
−−− +=−+
υ
υυυυυυυυ λτλ
t
kbtttttttt kRbRlwc )()1(( 0,,0,,0,,,,  
And using (16) and (17), we get 
)()( 0,,0,,,, 0,,, υυυυυ
υυ
υ
υυυβ kRbRUlUcU kb
t
cttlttc
t
tttt
+=+∑∞
=
−−
−
−−  
 
Using (16) and (17) for υ=t, we get 
)1(
1
0,
0,
ttl
c
wU
U
t
t
τ−−=    (22) 
 
Since right-hand side doesn’t depend on υ, we have  
0,
0,
,
,
t
t
tt
tt
l
c
l
c
U
U
U
U =
−
−
υ
υ  
 
Similarly using (16) and (18) or (19), we get 
1,
1
0,
1,1
+
=+
tkc
c
RU
U
t
t
β
   (23) 
Again, since right-hand side does not depend on υ, we have 
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0,
1,1
,
1,1
t
t
tt
tt
c
c
c
c
U
U
U
U +
−
−++ =
υ
υ  
Thus, (3), (11), (12) and (13) are necessary conditions that any competitive 
equilibrium must satisfy. 
Conversely, given any allocation {ct,t-υ , lt,t-υ , kt+1,t+1-υ} for all t and υ≤t that satisfy 
(3), (11), (12) and (13), we can construct the competitive equilibrium as follows: 
Define before-tax prices as 
),( ttkt lkfr =  
),( ttlt lkfw =  
And define after-tax prices as 
)1(
1
0,
0,
ttl
c
wU
U
t
t
τ−−=  
1,
1
0,
1,1
+
=+
tkc
c
RU
U
t
t
β
 
and let υ
υ
υ βλ −−− = ttcttt U ,, for all t and υ≤t.  
Then by construction {ct,t-υ , lt,t-υ , kt+1,t+1-υ}satisfies individuals first-order conditions 
(16), (17), (18) and (19). 
Defining recursively for υ=0,1,2,…  
υυυυυυ δθτ −++−−−−−++ −−+−−++−= 1,1,,,,,1,1 )))(1(1()1( tttttttbtttttttttt kcbRkrlwb  
gives that individuals budget constraint and transversality conditions are satisfied, 
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To show that government budget constraint is satisfied multiply each individual’s, 
who at period t, budget constraint by t
t
n
nn
)1(
)1(
+
+ −υ and sum up them over υ. Then, we 
get 
 
))))(1(1()1((
)1(
)1()(
)1(
)1(
0
,..,.
0
1.1,1,1∑ ∑
=
−−−
=
−
−++−−++
−
+−−++−+
+=+++
+t
tttbtttttttt
t
t
t
ttttttt
t
bRkrlw
n
nnkcb
n
nn
υ
υυυ
υ
υ
υυυ
υ
δθτ
 
kRbRlwknbnc tkttbtttttt ,,11 )1()1()1( ++−=++++ ++ τ  
Rewriting feasibility constraint as 
tttttttt krlwgkknc +=+−−++ + )1()1( 1 δ  
and subtracting from the previous one, we get 
ttttttttttb krlwbngbR )()1( 1, δθτ −+++=+ +  
 
 
 
3.2 Characterization of Optimal Policies 
 
Let µυ be the Lagrange multiplier associated with implementability constraint and 
embed this constraint into the social welfare function and denote by  
))(())(( 0,,0,,,,, ,,, υυυυυ
υυυυυ
υ
υ υυυ µµβ kRbRUlUcUUW kb
t
cttlttctt
t
tttttt
+−++= ∑∞
=
−−−
−
−−− (24 
 
Now the Ramsey problem is  
 17 
 
∑∞
=0
max
υ
υ
υγ W    (25) 
Subject to resource constraint (3), and implemantability constraints (11), (12) and 
(13). 
Let γtρt , γtηt,t-υ , γtϕ t,t-υ be Lagrange multipliers on the resource constraint (3), and 
implemantability constraints (12) and (13). The first-order conditions for Ramsey 
problem are: 
For all t 
0
)1(
)1(
,1,1,, ,1,1
1
,
1
=−−−+
++ −−−−−− −−−−−−
−
l
ctt
tc
ctt
tc
ctt
t
tt
t
c tttttttt
HHH
n
nnW υυυυ υυυ
υ
υ ηγϕγϕγργγ  
wrt [ct,t-υ]  for all 0≤υ<t   (26) 
0
)1(
)1(
,1,1,, ,1,1
1
,
1
=−−−+
+− −−−−−− −−−−−−
−
l
ltt
tc
ltt
tc
ltt
t
ttt
t
l tttttttt
HHHw
n
nnW υυυυ υυυ
υ
υ ηγϕγϕγργγ      
wrt [lt,t-υ] for all 0≤υ<t   (27) 
0)1()1(
11
1 =+−−+ +++ tktttt fn δργργ       [kt+1]              (28) 
∑∑
=
−
=
− =−−++ −−
t
l
ctt
t
t
c
ctt
t
t
t
c
t
ttttt
HH
n
nW
0
,
0
, 01 ,,0, υ
υ
υ
υ υυ ηγϕγργγ     [ct,0] for υ=t   (29) 
∑∑
=
−
=
− =−−++ −−
t
l
ltt
t
t
c
ltt
t
tt
t
l
t
ttttt
HH
n
nW
0
,
0
, 01 ,,0, υ
υ
υ
υ υυ ηγϕγωργγ     [lt,0]  for υ=t   (30) 
where 
υυυυ −− +−−=− tttttt lclcl tt UUUUH ,,0,, loglogloglog,  and   (31) 
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υυυ −−+++ +−−=− tttttt ccccctt UUUUH ,1,10,1,1 loglogloglog,     (32) 
 
Differentiating υ
υγ W with respect to υ−ttc , and υ−++ 1,1 ttc , and dividing one to the other 
and using (26), we get 
 
 
 
           
           
    
For the left-hand side, multiply it by υυβ −+−++ ttttt ckc URU ,11,1 / , and denote by  
 
υ
υυ υυ
υ
−
−− −−
−
+=
tt
tttt
c
ttlcttccc
tt U
lUcU
M
,
,, ,,
,      (34) 
For the right-hand side, multiply it by 
)1(
)1(
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n
f
t
kt t
+
+− ++
ρ
δγρ
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We call the term cttc
tt
c
tt M
U
W
υυυ
υ
υ µµ −
−
− ++= ,
,
, 1  as the general equilibrium expenditure 
elasticity. This elasticity captures the distortions relevant for setting taxes on capital 
income in general equilibrium.  
So, 
Proposition 2: Capital tax rate are different from zero unless c tt
c
tt MM υυ −++− = 1,1,  and 
c
tt
c
tt ZZ υυ −++− = 1,1, . 
 
3.3 Steady State 
 
Now suppose that the solution to the Ramsey problem converges to a steady state. 
Unlike OLG models with finitely-lived agents, in our model consumption and labor 
supply of individuals are constant over their lifetimes. So the implementability 
constraints (12) and (13) are not binding in steady state, thus the Langrange 
multiplier on these constraints, φ and η are zero. Therefore, from (34) and (35) 
c
tt
c
tt ZZ υυ −++− = 1,1, =0 and c ttctt MM υυ −++− = 1,1, .  
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Thus, 
Proposition 3: If the solution to the Ramsey problem converges to a steady state, 
then in the steady state the capital income tax rates are zero. 
 
3.4 Steady State for Vintage Specific Taxes 
 
Now, consider the case when the government be allowed to tax individuals of 
different vintages differently, i.e. it may be that   
υν
υν
θθ
ττ
−−
−−
≠
≠
tttt
tttt
,,
,,  for ν≠υ and ν,υ≤t 
In this case, we need not impose the implementability constraints (12) and (13) to 
the Ramsey problem. So the first parentheses on the right-hand side of eq (36) will 
reduce to 1.  
Corollary: With the vintage specific taxes, if the solution to the Ramsey problem 
converges to a steady state, then in the steady state the capital income tax rates are 
zero. 
So, the optimality of capital taxes, in the steady state does not depend on the 
richness of government policy instruments. 
 
3.5 Additively Separable Utility Functions 
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For certain specific utility functions, Chamley (1986) showed that in infinitely-lived 
agent model that the optimal capital income taxes are zero after the second period, 
provided no restriction on capital tax rates. Here we use additively separable utility 
function to show that for such type preferences capital taxes are zero even along the 
transition path for the vintage specific tax case, but not zero when there is no ability 
to differentiate between vintages.  
Assume utility function of the following form, 
 )(
1
)1,(
1
lVclcU +−=−
−
σ
σ
  
For this type of utility function  
σσ σ
υ
υ
σ
υυ
υ
υ
υ −=−== −
−
−
−−
−−
−
−
−
tt
tttt
c
ttccc
tt c
cc
U
cU
M
tt
tt
,
,
1
,,
,
,
,   and 
υ
σ
υ
υ
υυυ
−
−==−=−=
−
−
−−−−−
ttc
ccl
c
c
c
c
c cU
U
HHH
tt
tt
tttttt
,,
,
,1,1,
 
So, for this type of utility function, c tt
c
tt MM υυ −++− = 1,1,  and the left-hand side of eq. 
(36) becomes simply 
1+tkR .  
And for the vintage specific taxes, the condition c tt
c
tt ZZ υυ −++− = 1,1, =0.  
Since, cc MM 1,10,0 ≠ , the capital income tax is not necessarily equal to zero in period 
1. 
Thus, 
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Proposition 4: With the vintage specific taxes, for the additively separable utility 
functions, the optimal capital income tax rates are zero after the period t>1.  
With vintage independent taxes, for the additively separable utility functions 
c
tt
c
tt MM υυ −++− = 1,1, , but it is not necessarily that c ttctt ZZ υυ −++− = 1,1, .  
So for the additively separable utility functions with vintage independent taxes 
capital income taxes are not necessarily equal to zero along the transition path   
 
3.6 Comparison with other Models 
 
 
In the following table, I compare our results for optimal capital taxation with results 
in infinitely lived agent models and finitely lived overlapping generation models. I 
compare steady state capital tax for general utility functions, for additively separable 
utility functions and capital tax in the transition path for additively separable utility 
functions. The comparison is made for both uniform across generation and vintage 
specific tax cases.  
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Vintage Specific Tax Case 
 
 Infinitely-Lived 
Agent Model 
Infinitely-Lived 
OLG Model  
Finitely-Lived 
OLG Model 
In steady-state 
with general 
utility function 
 
0 
 
0 
Not necessarily 
0 
In steady-state 
with additively 
separable utility 
function  
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
In transition path 
with additively 
separable utility 
function 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
 
Vintage Independent Tax Case 
 
 Infinitely-Lived 
OLG Model  
Finitely-Lived 
OLG Model 
In steady-state 
with general 
utility function 
 
0 
Not necessarily 0 
In steady-state 
with additively 
separable utility 
function  
 
0 
 
Not necessarily 0 
In transition path 
with additively 
separable utility 
function 
 
Not necessarily 0 
 
Not necessarily 0 
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For vintage specific case with general utility function steady state capital income tax 
for our model are different from the results for finitely lived OLG model. For our 
model, in steady state general equilibrium expenditure elasticity is constant, however 
it may not be the case for finitely-lived OLG model.  
 Considering additively separable utility function, in the steady state 
two results will be the same, since general equilibrium expenditure elasticity for this 
type of functions are constant.  
 When government has restrictions on policy instruments, for our 
model this restriction does not matter, since in the steady state consumption over the 
individual’s life is constant. But this may not be the case for finitely lived OLG 
model, where the steady state consumption may not be constant. Even assuming 
additively separable functions, which stabilize general equilibrium expenditure 
elasticity does not change this result.  
 Along the transition path for both cases, general equilibrium 
expenditure elasticity is constant and for vintage specific tax case marginal rate of 
substitution between future consumption and present consumption across individuals 
of different vintages and marginal rate of substitution between consumption and 
labor across individuals of different vintages need not be constant, capital income 
tax could be set as zero. 
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However for uniform across generations tax case, it is constant, so capital taxes are 
not necessarily equal to zero. 
Since our model converts to infinitely lived agent model, when population growth is 
equal to zero, n=0, infinitely lived agent model preserves all established properties 
of our model.     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 26 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4 CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
In this paper, we have shown that the optimal long-run tax on capital income is zero 
in infinitely lived overlapping generations economy for both cases when government 
has the ability to tax capital and labor income of individuals of different vintages 
differently and when it has no such an ability.  
Our results are stronger than the ones for finitely lived OLG models. Without 
making any assumption about utility function, I get the optimality of non-taxing 
capital income in the long run, which is not necessarily so in finitely lived OLG 
models (Atkenson et.al (1999), Erosa and Gervais (1998)). And this results does not 
depend on the richness of government’s fiscal instruments, by which I mean ability 
of government, at any period to tax capital and labor income of individuals of 
different vintages differently.   
For additively separable utility functions, if government has a rich set of fiscal 
instruments, then capital income tax is zero even in transition path. However, 
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restricting government to the uniform across generation tax may not lead to the same 
result. 
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